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World War Prize Law Applied
in a Limited War Situation:
Egyptian Restrictions on
Neutral Shipping With Israelt
Establishment of an economic or military blockade raises
the currently interesting problem of determining what
cargoes, if any, should be allowed to reach the enemy.
During the two World Wars, using nineteenth century
limited war doctrines, Allied prize courts created a body
of globally-oriented international prize law. After tracing
this development, the author examines its applicability to
a modem limited war situation in the context of the
Egyptian-Israeli conflict. He concludes with an analytical
discussion of standards to be used in carrying over nine-
teenth century and World War prize doctrines to a pres-
ent day limited war.
Thomas D. Brown, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Although the exercise by Egypt of belligerent rights to inter-
fere with neutral shipping to Israel is most often discussed in
terms of Egypt's duties under the Constantinople Convention and
obligations imposed through United Nations membership, the
purpose of this article is to examine the scope of her belligerent
rights and duties with respect to neutrals under general doctrines
of international law. The central doctrine Egypt has applied has
been the right of contraband control. In applying it, Egypt has
relied upon the scope of that right as defined by the Allied belliger-
ents of the past two World Wars. The Allies, involved in global
wars, expanded the scope of belligerent rights over neutral rights
at sea far beyond what had been done during the limited wars
of the nineteenth century.
tThis article is based on a paper originally prepared in fulfillment of the
third year seminar requirement at the Harvard Law School. The author
would like to express his thanks to Professor Richard R. Baxter of the Harvard
Faculty whose aid included, but was not limited to, suggesting the topic and
the research sources.
*M1ember of the District of Columbia Bar.
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The problem is to discover the extent to which Egypt has been
successful in applying these global war precedents and to discuss
the possibility of finding new standards for their application in
a limited war situation. Such a discussion must consider the extent
to which neutrals have effectively sought to impose legal restric-
tions on the limited war belligerents more confining than those
imposed on the global war belligerents, for only through a proper
interaction between neutral and belligerent can limited war stand-
ards of contraband law be achieved.
I. THE PRECEDENT OF THE GLOBAL WARS
A. Tun NEW DEFINITION OF CONTRABAND
In the century preceding World War I, Great Britain1 did not
engage in a single war involving major naval operations.2 Thus, in
1914 the law of prize3 "stood ... virtually where it was left by
Lord Stowell at the end of the Napoleonic Wars."4 The unratified
Declaration of London of 1909' divided neutral cargo into the
three standard categories: conditional contraband, unconditional
or absolute contraband, and "free" goods. The signatories agreed
that the declaration contained "the generally recognised [s8i] prin-
ciples of international law"8 pertaining to neutral and belligerent
rights at sea. Susceptibility to use in war was needed if goods were
to be considered war contraband. 7 Conditional contraband in-
cluded those items susceptible either to peaceful or belligerent use.
Under the customary law, they could be seized only if destined for
the enemy government or its armed forces. Absolute contraband,
or specialized war goods, could be seized if found merely to be
bound for territory controlled by the enemy. 'Tree" goods, or
noncontraband, could not be seized.
1. Egyptian prize law has modeled itself primarily on British practice.
See The Hoegh De Vries, [1950] Int'l L. Rep. 447 (No. 150), 6 RlvuE
EGPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [hereinafter cited R.E.D .] 225 (1950)
where the court states: "The Egyptian Prize Courts have, in general, adopted
the British rules in Prize matters . .. ."
2. Fitzmaurice, Some Aspects of Moderm Contraband Control and The
Law of Prize, 22 BRaT. YB. INT'L L. 73, 74 (1945).
3. Prize law is that system of laws and rules applicable to the capture of
prize at sea; its condemnation, right of captors, and distribution of proceeds.
BLrcK, Le&w DIcTIONARY 1363 (4th ed. 1951).
4. Fitzmaurice, supra note 2, at 74.
5. Reprinted in SMITH, THE LAw AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 185-212 (2d
ed. 1950).
6. Id. at 185.
7. See TUCKER, WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 263 (U.S. Naval War
College, International Law Studies, 1955).
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Shortly after the outbreak of World War I, the belligerents
moved most items on the "free" list to the conditional list and
most of those on the conditional list to the absolute list.8 In
World War II, Britain and most of the belligerents abandoned the
technique of specific listings used in the Declaration of London in
favor of broad inclusive categoriesf Although the distinction
between absolute and conditional contraband was formally re-
tained, this distinction was rendered meaningless in actual prac-
tice.
This blurring of the distinction between absolute and condi-
tional contraband was due in part to the expanded definition of
"warlike use" which had evolved in World War 1.10 The expansion
was justified on the grounds that modern technology had rendered
practically every import susceptible to military use.1 In addition,
this concept was expanded to include goods which sustained the
civilian sphere of the economy, thereby "affording any help ...
to the enemy in his prosecution of the war. 12 Consequently, the
national economic base sustaining the war effort was now con-
ceived of as a vital and appropriate target of contraband control."
A particular item could now be confiscated as absolute contraband
either when there was a probability that it would be used in the
war effort,14 or that it would indirectly sustain the waging of
war.
1 5
The scope of the contraband control power was also expanded
on the theory that mere territorial destination was sufficient to
condemn conditional contraband 6 because total state control in
a dictatorship was such that all goods bound for the country could
be considered as bound for the state.
8. See SAnrTr, op. cit. supra note 5, at 266.
9. See copy of contraband list proclaimed by Great Britain in 1939 and
subsequently adopted by New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and France. U.S.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS 91-92 (1944-45);
TucKER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 267 n.7.
10. TuCKEn, op. cit. supra note 7, at 266.
11. Ibid.
12. CoLOMos, PRIZE 187 (3d ed. 1949).
13. See generally 1 -EDLICOTT, Tn EcoNomic BLOCKADE 1 (1952), quot-
ing the official definition of the "Economic Warfare" which was to be waged
by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare.
14. See STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 481 (2d
impression rev. 1959); Tucnan, op. cit. supra note 7, at 266 n.6.
15. See The ilakan, [1916] P. 266, 272; COLOmBOS, op. cit. supra note 12,
at 197.
16. CoLoMBos, op. cit. supra note 12, at 195-98; STONE, Op. cit. supra note
14, at 484; TucKER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 268-69 n.10.
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In The Alwaki and Other Vessels17 the British Prize Court con-
demned foodstuffs bound for Germany on the ground that "there
is the clearest possible evidence of German decrees which .. .
impose Government control on all these articles and prescribe
that they are automatically seized at the moment of crossing the
frontier .... ." In The Monte Contes's the court held that it was
a matter of common notoriety that Italy, "as ruler of a totalitarian
State," requisitioned and disposed of goods in the manner that
would best promote the war effort.
These and other prize cases may appear to have stated
the problem of conditional contraband as one of proof, the notion
being that the line between combatant and noncombatant could
no longer be drawn with clarity. In fact the courts were saying
that the distinction was no longer relevant. The premises under-
lying global war, with the enemy's economic base a key objective
of belligerent operations, are totally inconsistent with any com-
batant, noncombatant distinction. This attitude is most clearly
indicated in The Hakan 9 where the court found the distinction
irrelevant on the ground that an increase in the civilian food
supply would release an equal quantity of other goods to the mili-
tary. Although the court was dealing with cargoes bound for
totalitarian states, this was not a factor necessary to support the
decision.
B. CONTINUOUS VOYAGE UPDATED: Ti PROBLEM OF
ULTIMATE DESTINATION
In both World Wars, direct overseas trade between neutrals
and the Axis powers was almost totally cut off by Allied "war
zones"20 and long-distance blockades,2' both instituted as reprisals
for allegedly illegal acts of the enemy against neutral shipping.
In both wars, therefore, prize law developed primarily in the con-
text of trade between overseas or "adjacent" neutrals and the
enemy?2 Since hostile destination is required for contraband con-
17. [1938-40] Ann. Dig. 585, 586 (No. 223).
18. [1943-45] Ann. Dig. 544, 548 (No. 196).
19. [1918] A.C. 148, 151; see CoNmos, op. cit. supra note 12, at 196.
20. See SMITH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 97-99; TucKER, op. cit. supra note
7, at 296-305.
21. See CoToAMuos, op. cit. supra note 12, at 266-83; STONE, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 500-22; TuCKE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 305-15.
22. These terms were used by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare
to distinguish, for purposes of economic blockade policy, between neutrals
adjacent to the enemy and those overseas from him. 1 M aDLicoT, op. cit.
supra note 13, at 19-21.
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demnation, an extensive application of the doctrine of continuous
voyage or ultimate destination was central to the development
of global war contraband law. The basic principle of this doc-
trine was that the neutral could not do indirectly what he was
barred from doing directly; it could not protect cargoes from
seizure by claiming an ostensibly neutral destination when, in
fact, the cargo was ultimately bound for the enemy. Furthermore,
doctrine had to be updated to meet the more difficult problems of
proof caused by the ease with which transshipments from neutral
to enemy destination could be made and the ease with which such
transactions could be legally camouflaged to avoid belligerent
detection.
In order to aid themselves in establishing a reasonable suspicion
of hostile destination, a series of presumptions were evolved by
the Prize Court and by Orders-in-Council which furnished the
court with prima facie grounds for condemnation. The British
Order-in-Council of July 7, 1916 declared that enemy destination
was presumed to exist:
until the contrary is shown, if the goods are consigned . . . to or
for a person who, during the present hostilities, has forwarded contra-
band goods to an enemy authority, or an agent of the enemy state, or
to or for a person in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy,
or if the goods are consigned "to order", or if the ship's papers do not
show who is the real consignee of the goods.24
There was also a presumption of enemy destination if the claim-
ants attempted to withhold material documents in their possession
or produced false papers, if the consignor or consignee was on the
blacklist, or if either the shipper or consignee was closely associ-
ated through trade operations with the enemy.r5 In addition, the
absence of a "navicert ' ' 26 was considered a "suspicion" of enemy
destination. 7
23. The doctrine is formally called the doctrine of "ultimate enemy desti-
nation." CoLOmmos, op. cit. sup 'a note 12, at 187-92; TucKEn, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 270.
24. U.S. NAvAL WAR CoI=GGE, INTFA ATIONAL LAW DocumwTs 49
(194-45).
25. See CoLoMnos, op. cit. supra note 12, at 206-09.
26. Navicerts were "certificates issued by the diplomatic or consular rep-
resentative of the belligerent in a neutral country testifying that the cargo
on a vessel proceeding to a neutral port was not such as to be liable to
seizure." 2 OPPENHEIm, INTmwATIONAL LAW § 421b, at 855 (7th ed. Lauter-
pacht 1952). For a comprehensive discussion of the navicert system during
World War I see Rrrc m, THE "NAvIcERT" SysTma DuRING THE Woam
WAR (1938).
27. See CoLozmos, op. cit. n upra note 12, at 217.
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Under the doctrine of "rationing,"2 8 if an "adjacent" neutral
imported goods in excess of its normal peacetime requirements as
determined by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, the ulti-
mate destination of the excess was presumed to be the enemyP9
Thus, unlike the other assumptions which attempted to establish
some factual connections between the particular goods in question
and the probability of hostile destination, the doctrine of "ration-
ing" provided grounds for seizure and condemnation based on
statistical probabilities in no way related to the particular facts
surrounding the shipment in question. This has been described as
"the most striking, and certainly the most controverted, develop-
ment in the expansion of belligerent claims to control neutral
trade in contraband.""
Although traditional law had limited belligerents to the exer-
cising of their rights of visit and search while at sea, effective ap-
plication of the continuous voyage principle under modern con-
ditions required British naval patrols to divert neutral shipping to
Contraband Control Bases in Great Britain while information was
gathered as to the cargo in question."1 If the captor established a
prima facie case of ultimate enemy destination, the claimant then
had the burden of rebutting the inference 2 Since the control of
neutral shipping by the discretionary grant of navicerts removed
the effective administration of the doctrine of ultimate destination
from the jurisdictional control of the prize court, it would appear
that the global war implementation of the doctrine involved more
28. See 1 MUDIcoTT, op. cit. supra note 13, at 124-33, 422-24, 432, for
consideration of the practical planning problems. Medlicott reveals that com-
pulsory rationing served such ends as "preventing the accumulation of large
stocks of dangerous commodities in adjacent neutral territory" so as not to
tempt enemy conquest of that neutral. Id. at 424. It appears that there was a
diversity of political and military considerations which determined what
would be an adequate quantity of imports for domestic consumption. See
TucKER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 274-75; Fitzmaurice, sumra note 2, at 89-95.
29. See TucKER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 274-75.
So. Ibid.
31. See id. at 272. For a factual description of the diversion and contraband
control base process, see 1 MDLICOTT, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 70-85.
32. This was initially decided in The Louisiana and Other Ships, [1918]
5 Lloyd's Prize Cases 230, 252. During World War I1 the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council reaffirmed the principle in the following terms:
The captor has to maintain his seizure by showing the case of reasonable
suspicion in order to justify what he did. The claimant has to establish
by evidence of fact his affirmative case, which he can do in a case like
this by showing the precise character of the adventure and showing that
the ostensible destination is the real destination.
The Monte Contes, [1943-45] Ann. Dig. 544, 545 (No. 196).
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than a mere adaptation of substantive prize case law to fit new
circumstances. 3
C. THE REPisAL CONTEXT OF GLoBAL Wn CONTRABAND LAW
In the global war setting, prize court condemnation became a
less important means of contraband control than other tech-
niques"4 which were justified on the basis of reprisal for alleged
breaches of international law committed by the Axis powers.
The reprisal Order-in-Council of July 31, 194011 came in
response to the expansion of Axis power on the continent during
the preceding months. The traditional scheme of interception and
diversion through patrolling principal trade routes to key ports
of adjacent neutrals became unworkable because of the size of the
coastline which had to be patrolled. Controlling neutral shipping
at the source became essential! 6 The reprisal instituted a three-
fold system of controls consisting of "compulsory" navicerting,
forced rationing of neutrals and ship warrants. 7 Although most
of the controls found precedent in the prior war, Medlicott con-
cludes that "the comprehensiveness of the scheme represented a
substantial innovation ... ."38
The new Order-in-Council made mere absence of a navicert
grounds for seizure of ship and cargo 9 The British also extended
the use of Ship's War Trade Lists which blacklisted "vessels with
whose records the British authorities were dissatisfied." 40 No
navicert would be issued to ships "on the Statutory List, Ships'
Black List or the Ships' Discrimination List. ' 41 The ship warrant
system also supplemented the navicert scheme. These were issued
to each ship whose owner had promised to comply with the Brit-
33. As defined by Lauterpacht:
[R]eprisals in time of war occur when one belligerent retaliates upon
another, by means of otherwise illegitimate acts of warfare, in order to
compel him and his subjects and members of his forces to abandon
illegitimate acts of warfare and to comply in future with the rules of
legitimate warfare.
2 OPPExNEzi, op. cit. supra note 26, § 247 at 561.
34. See generally Fitzmaurice, supra note 2, at 74.
35. See TucERm, op. cit. supra note 7, at 313. For the full text of this
document see [1940] 1 Stat. Rules & Orders 1129 (No. 1436).
86. 1 AmmLIcoTT, op. cit. supra note 13, at 413-17.
37. TucKER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 314 n.76.
38. 1 AfmmIcoTT, op. cit. supra note 13, at 422.
39. Tucnuu, op. cit. supra note 7, at 314.
40. 1 M _ Lcor', op. cit. supra note 13, at 447.
41. Id. at 438.
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ish regulation of neutral shipping.4 The British would deny the
various world-wide shipping facilities under their control to any
of the company's ships not having the warrant.43
This network of "source" controls on neutral shipping imposed,
in effect, a long-distance44 blockade of all goods indirectly bound
for the enemy or originating with the enemy -a blockade pre-
ceded by prohibition of all direct trade between neutrals and the
enemy belligerent. By submitting to such a system of controls,
the neutral shipper might be considered by enemy belligerents to
have engaged in an act of nonneutral service. 45 Thus, in the future
the neutral might be forced to comply with a system of belligerent
control which in turn creates nonneutral service grounds for
seizure by the other belligerent.46
II. EGYPTIAN 1AEASURES OF
CONTRABAND CONTROL
A. IN-TiAL MEASURES
The present "war"47 between Egypt and Israel began on May
42. Id. at 422.
43. Ibid. For a comprehensive discussion of "Sovereign Right" measures
taken by the Allies in World War I, consult 3 TuRLINGTON, NuEuTRnArrr,
ITs HISTORY, ECONOMICS Aim LIw: THE WORLD WA PERIOD 67-99 (1936).
44. See Tucmm, op. cit. supra note 7, at 305-06, where he states that the
British long-distance blockade policy rested largely on two orders in council
-those of March 11, 1915 and of February 16, 1917.
45. Lauterpacht explains that the state of neutrality involves both rights
and duties, including the duty of "abstaining from assisting either belligerent
whether actively or passively . . . ." 20 OPPmNHEm, op. cit. supra note 26, §
297, at 659. Thus, "according to customary rules of International Law,
adopted also in the Declaration of London, a neutral vessel may be captured
if visit or search establishes the fact, or arouses grave suspicion, that she is
rendering unneutral service to the enemy." Id. at 841. See also the statement
that: "It seems reasonably well-established that a neutral merchant vessel in
accepting a safe-conduct pass from a belligerent subjects himself to the control
of the latter and performs an act of unneutral service." TucKER, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 822.
46. Ibid. See 7 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (1943).
47. For purposes of this discussion it is assumed Egypt's contention that
a state of war continues to exist between it and Israel is valid, and that it is
justified in exercising rights of belligerency despite the General Armistice
Agreement between Israel and Egypt, signed at Rhodes, February 24, 1949,
42 U.N.T.S. 251. For the Egyptian arguments to this effect, see Conclusions
du Gouvernement Egyptien au 8ujet des plaintes des Gouvernementa etrangers
guant a la visite des navires neutres et la aaisie des objets de contrebande
damt les ports egyptiena, [hereinafter referred to as Conclusions du Gouverne-
ment Egyptien] 7 R.E.D.I. 235, 238 (1951); Ghobashy, Egypt's Attitude
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15, 1948, when the state of Israel was created and armed hostilities
commenced between the two states. On that date the Egyptian
Government established an inspection service for all ships entering
its harbors.48 Subsequent military proclamations in May49 and
June 0 provided for the seizure of all goods and munitions on
ships destined directly or indirectly for Israel. Such capture was
to be exercised "in accordance with the rules established by public
international law." 51 In addition, port authorities were authorized
to refuse to provision vessels suspected of aiding the Israelis. 52
The validity of a seizure made under these preceding authori-
zations was to be decided by a "Conseil de Prses" or Prize Court
established by Proclamation No. 38 on July 8, 1948 3 Article 3
of the proclamation provided that contraband would include all
items sent directly or indirectly to Israel which might be of such
a nature as to intensify the Israeli war effort. 4 Furthermore,
article 3 stipulated that the court was to apply the rules of public
international law.55
In view of the relative freedom of the belligerent in defining
contraband during the two global wars, the President of the
Egyptian Prize Court concluded in 1949 that "lists of contraband
have lost their importance." 5 Instead, they were said to have
Towards International Law as Expressed in the United Nations- The Egyp-
tian Israeli Dispute on the Freedom of Navigation in the Suez Canal, 11
R.E.D.I. 121 (1955). For a summation of the argument in rebuttal see
Gross, Passage Through the Suez Canal of Israel-Bound Cargo and Israel
Ships, 51 Aw. J. INT'L L. 530, 543-49 (1957). See Resolution of the Security
Council of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. No. S/2298/Rev. 1 (1951), for the
official view of the United Nations.
48. JomwAL OFFciAL DU Gouvman T EGYPTIMN [hereinafter cited as
J.O.] No. 51 (May 15, 1948). For a listing of subsequent proclamations and
decrees through June 1949, see Brinton, Palestine Conflict- Summary of
Principal War Measures Including Proclamations, Decrees, Arretes, Notices
and Memoranda, 5 R.E.D. 73 (1949).
49. J.0. No. 55 (May 19, 1948).
50. J.O. No. 89 (June 28, 1948).
51. 3.0. No. 55 (May 19, 1948).
52. Ibid.
53. J.0. No. 93 (July 8, 1948), subsequently codified as Loi n. 32 du 12
Avril 1950 relative au Conseil des Prises, J.0. No. 64 (June 26, 1950); see
Brinton, supra note 45, at 76, for later proclamations relating to the Prize
Court. The procedural aspects of the Prize Court are discussed in Ahmed
Safwat Bey, The Egyptian Prize Court: Organization and Procedure, 5
R.E.D.I. 28 (1949).
54. J.0. No. 93 (July 8, 1948).
55. Ibid.
56. See Ahmed Safwat Bey, supra note 53, at 30.
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been "replaced by the generally accepted idea of considering as
contraband all goods that help to strengthen the war effort."'57
Subsequently, however, Egypt did produce several successive
contraband lists modeled substantially on the expansive global
war definitions of contraband. 5 Egypt has maintained that sub-
sequent to the initial control measures it has constantly sought
instructions to ease tensions whenever possible through its Prize
Court.59 However, it does not appear that the decree of February
6, 1950,60 as modified in 1953- the official contraband list-
has involved any less stringent a standard than was laid down in
1949. In 1957, citing the amended decree, the Prize Court in
The Fedala,1' held "goods which strengthened the war effort"
contraband.
The 1950 Royal Decree also provided the first codification of
the presumptions of ultimate enemy destination.6 2 Borrowing
largely from World War precedent, hostile destination was to be
presumed if the ship was known to be a contraband carrier, if the
shipowner or consignees had sufficient commercial ties with the
Israelis, or if the consignors or consignees were on the blacklist."
Hostile destination was also to be presumed for vessels bound for
a port "in the vicinity of a port controlled by the enemy. '64
57.
Since the importation of luxuries and unnecessary commodities is
generally prohibited during war, it follows that practically all imports
were considered necessary to the economic and military effort of the
country shall be condemned as contraband [Vk].
It has been ironically remarked that every state fixes the list of
contraband for her enemy by fixing the list of imports allowed in her
territory.
All imports allowed by a belligerent are thereby likely to be con-
sidered as contraband by her enemies.
See id. at 29.
58. See The Klpfontein, [1949] Ann. Dig. 589 (No. 210), 5 R.E.D.I. 147
(secondhand clothing confiscated); The Bataan, [1949] Ann. Dig. 590 (No.
211), 5 R.E.D.I. 150 (used footwear and overcoats confiscated); The Empire
Pickwick, [1949] Ann. Dig. 597, 598 (No. 216) 5 R.E.D1I. 148 (tobacco con-
fiscated); The Denis Gulu, [1949] Ann. Dig. 598 (No. 217), 5 R.E.D.I. 145
(cargo of bran held as contraband). In The Fedala, [1957] Int'l L. Rep. 992,
13 R.E.D.I. 131, the Royal Decree of 1950 as amended was invoked to permit
confiscation of a cargo of meat, hides, and personal effects.
59. Coneluions du Gouvenement Egyptien, pra note 47, at 251.
60. J.O. No. 36 (April 3, 1950); U.N. SECURITY COUNCI OFF. REC. 9th
year, 662d meeting (S/3179) (1954).
61. [1957] Int'l L. Rep. 992, 943, 13 R.E.D.I. 131.
62. J.O. No. 36 (April 3, 1950).
63. Ibid.
64. U.N. SECURITY CouNcm OFF. REC. 9th year, 662d meeting (S/3179)
(1954).
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B. THE EGYPTIAN DEFN'ITION OF CONTRB -AND
In 1949 the President of the Egyptian Prize Court stated that
during the two World Wars the distinction between absolute and
conditional contraband was waived by the prize courts0 5 In the
early cases, the Prize Court adhered, in a somewhat uncertain
manner, to the formal distinction while depriving it of content by
applying the global war expansive concept of hostile destination.
In The Klipfontein,0 the first case to discuss this issue, a cargo
of secondhand clothes consigned to Israel and intended for relief
purposes was seized and held confiscable. The court stated:
It cannot be doubted that the clothes consigned to civilians of a
belligerent may be used by the armed forces, and, if they are in fact
sent to civilians then-by virtue of the mobilization of all the forces
of the country and the employment of civilians in defense operations or
assisting the military-the clothes assist the war effort and must be
regarded as conditional contraband of war.6
In The Tripor ,0 the court finally discarded the distinction alto-
gether, citing a World War I case, The Hakan. 9 The court con-
cluded that "articles of relative contraband [foodstuffs] have
become absolute contraband, becoming thereby liable to capture
whether or not destined for the use of the civilian population."70
C. THE EGYPTIAN PRIZE COURT AND THE PROBLEM OF
ULTIiATE DESTINATION
The Egyptian military proclamations of 1948 establishing the
system of inspection of neutral vessels, incorporated the basic doc-
trine of continuous voyage by its reference to goods bound indi-
rectly for Israel. 71 As noted, the statutory presumptions of hostile
65. Ahmed Safwat Bey, supra note 53, at 30.
66. [1949] Ann. Dig. 589 (No. 210), 5 R.E.D.I. 147.
67. Id. at 590.
68. [1949] Ann. Dig. 595, 6 R.E.D.L 216.
69. [1918] A.C. 544, 548 (No. 196).
70. See The Triport, [1949] Ann. Dig. 595, 6 R.E.DJ. 216. For an inter-
esting comment relating to these last three cases, see the remarks of the
Egyptian Ambassador to the U.N.:
In making out the list of commodities regarded as contraband, my
Government has confined the seizure and confiscation procedure to those
foodstuffs which are intended for the use of the Israel armed forces,
excluding foodstuffs which are intended for the use of the civil popula-
tion; .... [A]dhering to its attitude of scrupulous moderation, my Gov-
ernment has never applied the confiscation procedure to any cargo of
foodstuffs.
U-N. SEctUR Couicm OFF. REc. 9th year, 658th meeting 30, 31 (S/PV.
658) (1954).
71. J.O. No. 93 (July 8, 1948).
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destination provided by the 1950 Royal Decree were modeled sub-
stantially after global war precedents. 72
Although the majority of Egyptian prize cases have dealt with
direct shipments to or from Israel, the global war doctrine of ulti-
mate destination has been applied in several instances. One such
case which illustrates Egyptian practice is that of The Good Hope
Ca8tle.3 There, fifty sacks of coffee had been seized at Port Said
en route to Genoa "in transit" by order of an English corporation
with an "advice note" to a Milan company which had in turn sold
the goods to the Italian claimant. The Milan firm had several
branches including Cyprus and Haifa. The court found: (1) the
firm was on a blacklist for "dealing in contraband;" (2) the port
of Genoa was "notorious as a centre of contraband traffic to
Palestine;" and (3) as the goods were shipped "in transit" they
were "therefore quite clearly not destined for any locality in
Italy."74 Finally, an intercepted letter in the hands of the court
indicated that at the time of shipment Israel was in need of coffee.
All of these factors together, then, supported a presumption of
hostile destination.
In The Flying Trader,75 the court seized tractors bound for New
York via Genoa. It stated that given the necessary grounds for a
presumption of enemy destination, the burden is on the claimant
to prove that the cargo is bound for neutral territory, and "to
prove that in no way could the cargo have reached enemy ter-
ritory after its arrival in neutral territory" 76
During the World Wars, implementation of the continuous voy-
age principle was the central concern of the Western Allies in
attempting to control neutral trade with the enemy. For the
Egyptians, however, it has been a doctrine of clearly secondary
importance. Egypt has not engaged in the use of statistical pre-
sumptions of enemy destination in an attempt to control certain
segments of the intraneutral trade using the canal. And, although
Egypt has used the presumptions of enemy destination inherited
from global practice, in each case the court has tended to rely on
the total factual situation at hand rather than to rest merely on
statutory presumptions.
72. Ibid.
73. [1949] Ann. Dig. 574, 6 R.E.D.I. 214.
74. Id. at 575.
75. [1950] Int'l L. Rep. 440 (No. 149).
76. Id. at 443. The court cites The Louisiana and Other Ships, [1918] 5
Lloyd's Prize Cases 230.
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D. EGYPTLN "SouRcE" CONTROLS: RESTRICTIONS ON OIL
TANKER MOVEMENT
On June 18,1950, the Egyptian Council of 'Ministers introduced
regulations which required masters of tankers northbound through
the canal to specify the port of their final destination at Port
Said." Upon reaching the port of destination, the master was re-
quired to obtain a certification from local customs officials counter-
signed by the nearest Egyptian Consulate that the cargo was be-
ing discharged for local consumption.7 Finally, this certification
of local consumption was to be produced at Suez within one month
after discharge. 9 Tankers southbound through the canal were
required to produce their logbooks in order to indicate whether
they had previously stopped at an Israeli port. If this were the
case, they would be blacklisted and denied fuel, stores, and repair
facilities in Egyptian ports50 Egypt justified these new regulations
in terms of contraband control: "C'est pour faciliter les passage
de ces cargaisons innocentes que les nouvelles mesures . . .ont
ete adoptees par le Gouvernement Egyptien."''
The effectiveness of the measures taken is indicated by the con-
siderable volume of protests which single out tanker restrictions
for special commenta2 There did not appear to have been any
appreciable relaxation of these measures, however, prior to the
77. See N.Y. Times, July 24, 1949, p. 12, col. 3, where it is reported that
the Egyptian paper Al Mini had announced that henceforth force would be
used to detain tankers leaving Port Said without final clearance papers.
78. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1950, p. 37, col. 5.
79. Ibid.
80. Israel makes this charge at U.N. SECUR= CouNcM OFF. REC. 6th
year, 549th meeting 3 (S/PV.549) (1951). It is unclear whether this order
originated with the June 18, 1950, regulations or with the provisions of J.O.
No. 55 (May 19, 1948) which first authorized the withholding of port facili-
ties.
81. Note of the Egyptian Foreign Minister as quoted in Conclusion du
Gouvernement Egyptien, supra note 47, at 256.
82. For examples of a typical early protest, see N.Y. Times, July 28,
1950, p. 37, col. 5, where the American Merchant Marine Institute protests
the new restrictions on the grounds that: a) the master has the prerogative to
stop at any port en route to destination to save lives and property; b) he is in
no position to know if the oil is only for local consumption; c) it is doubtful
whether customs authorities ashore would have authority to countersign such
a declaration; d) master, owner, and customs authorities have no knowledge
of what is ultimately done with the oil; e) the plan is "impracticable, unwork-
able, objectionable and an unjustified interference with international trade."
In the N.Y. Times, August 24, 1950, p. 53, col. 5, it was reported that the
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Security Council Resolution of September 1,1951.3 After this date,
increased tanker traffic through the canal was reported. 4 From
that time onward it appears that Egypt continued to regard pe-
troleum as contraband but declined to require the above guaran-
tees of domestic consumption.
It is noteworthy that none of the above neutral complaints saw
fit to deal with the tanker restrictions on the grounds that they
were an illegal extension of the belligerent right to visit and search.
There was no legal comparison of these "source" restrictions with
those used by the Allies during the World Wars. This cannot be
read, however, as a tacit endorsement of the legality of these
measures since the neutrals refused to concede that Egypt had
legitimate belligerent status8 5 Of some significance also is the rela-
tive restraint exercised by such injured neutral powers as the
United Kingdom which confined itself to the normal diplomatic
and United Nations channels of protest without instituting any
economic countermeasures for these tanker restrictions.
E. EGYPTIAN "SouRcE" CoNTRoLs: BLACKLISTING
Since 1951 the primary operative sanction on neutral trade
with Israel has been the blacklisting of neutral vessels engaged
in the trade. All blacklisted ships have been denied access to
Egyptian port facilities0 6 In reply to neutral protests Egypt has
relied on global war precedent as justification for these measures8 7
arguing that: "Le refus d'aider les navires neutres qui assistent
Ambassadors to Egypt of the United States, Great Britain, and France had
all lodged protests.
83. For reports of neutral protests during the summer of 1951, following
the announcement of the relaxation of "unnecessary formalities," see N.Y.
Times, August 1, 1951, p. 8, col. 4; N.Y. Times, July 17, 1951, p. 11, col. 1;
N.Y. Times, July 13, 1951, p. 6, col. 3.
84. See'N.Y. Times, September 18, 1951, p. 5, col. 3, which reported that
"tanker traffic through the canal in the past week has increased to more than
ten daily." But see Israeli statement before the Security Council in 1954 that
few tankers go through Suez and stop at Haifa for fear of being blacklisted,
N.Y. Times, March 9, 1951, p. 8, col. 6.
85. U.N. Doc. No. S/2298/Rev.1 (1951).
86. J.O. No. 89 (June 28, 1948).
87.
Comment oublier que le Gouvernement Britannique, durant les deux
dernieres guerres, privait du charbon et autres combustibles, dans les
ports anglaLs, les navires neutres qui refusaient de se soumettre a son
controle, ou d'accepter les restrictions edictees relativement au com-
merce avec 'Allemagne et ses allies.
Conclusions du Gouvernement Egyptien, supra note 47, at 258.
PRIZE LAW
l'ennemi est tellement dans la nature des choses, qu'il ne saurait
etre considere comme contraire a la practique internationale en
la matiere."' s More specifically, Egypt has contended that despite
the international status of the canal, the adjacent port facilities
are under Egyptian sovereignty and hence could be withheld from
neutral usage. 9 By December 1950 approximately fifty ships of
different nationalities had been blacklistedV °
Despite the Security Council Resolution of September 1, 1951,"
calling for the Egyptians to remove sanctions applied to certain
neutral ships which had stopped at Israeli ports, Egypt has since
continued to blacklist neutral vessels 2 Arguing that the effective-
ness of Egypt's sanctions is indicated more by the absence than
the presence of incidents, Israel concluded in 1956 that "the
blacklist is . . . the most stringent of deterrents."9 3
F. TE NATURE AND EFFECT OF NEuTRAL PROTESTS
Egypt has not cut back the number of items included on its
contraband lists in response to neutral protestsY4 Rather, Egypt
has responded to neutral protests against the exercise of her bel-
ligerent rights by relaxing enforcement of those rights while allow-
ing them to remain essentially unchanged. Thus, in June 1949 the
British Ambassador was assured that the Egyptian check on sus-
pected contraband bound for Israel would become less rigorous 5
88. Ibid.
89. N.Y. Times, August 26, 1950, p. 5, col. 3.
90. N.Y. Times, December 21, 1950, p. 55, col. 2. However, Israel charged
88 ships were on the blacklist at that time, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1951, p. 8,
col. 6. The discrepancy might be explained by the report in N.Y. Times, Sep-
tember 18, 1951, p. 5, col. 3: "Egypt's blacklist is kept secret. No ship knows
she is on the blacklist until actually calling at an Egyptian port, where she may
be refused facilities."
91. "And further noting . . . that these restrictions together with sanc-
tions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel represent
unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas and
trade freely." U.N. Doc. No. S/2298/Rev. 1, 9, (1951).
92. For specific incidents, see N.Y. Times, September 21, 1951, p. 49, col.
3 (blacklisted U.S. ship detained but released after protests as a "gesture of
courtesy"), N.Y. Times, January 29, 1953, p. 51, col. 3 (Norwegian freighter
landing shipwreck survivors refused permission to take on food and water).
93. Letter from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security
Council, October 13, 1956. U.N. SEcuarr CouNciL OFF. REc. Supp. Jan.-
March at 6 (S/3673) (1956).
94. See text accompanying notes 56, 57, 59, 60, 61 upra.
95. See N.Y. Times, June 21, 1949, p. 8, col. 4, which also reports that
the Egyptian Government had instructed the Port Said Prize Board "to ease
restrictions on foreign shipping passing through the Suez Canal."
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It was also reported that since the February armistice the num-
ber of ships searched had steadily declined9 6
Much of this relaxation97 appears to have been due to the Secur-
ity Council Resolution of September 1, 1951,98 which expressed
many of the neutrals' objections made in preceding months and
years and which have since been invoked whenever later com-
plaints have arisen. The resolution found that Egypt had been
acting unlawfully in purporting to exercise belligerent rights in
view of its obligations under the Armistice of Rhodes and the
Security Council resolutions of August 11, 19501 and November
17, 1950;100 and that their continued exercise would be "incon-
sistent with the objectives of a peaceful settlement between the
parties."'0 1 It does not state that Egyptian contraband law as ap-
plied by the Prize Court has been at variance with customary in-
ternational prize doctrine. Nor does it state that the blacklisting
of neutral vessels and the imposition of "source '' 1°2 controls of
contraband traffic are violations or overextensions of customary
rights accorded belligerents.
Israel has maintained, however, that the decline in incidents
involving neutral trade with Israel has been due to the fact that
96. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1949, p. 5, col. 4, where it is reported that while
some 5,000 vessels had visited Egyptian ports at that time only 500 had been
searched.
97. In March 1954 Egypt stated before the United Nations Security Coun-
cil that: "Since the Security Council adopted its resolution of 1 September
1951, no ship or cargo has been confiscated by Egypt. Further, ... since that
date . . . only 55 suspected ships have been subjected to the inspection pro-
cedure out of 32,047 ships . .. ." U.N. SECURITY Coucm OFF. REc. 9th year,
661st meeting 17 (S/PV.661) (1954). However, see the incidents involving the
vessels Rimfrost, Franca Maria, and Laritan all brought before the Security
Council by Israel at U.N. SECURITY CoUNcIL OFF. REC. 9th year, 658th meet-
ing 13 (S/PV.658) (1954). Egypt's reply is at U.N. SECURITY CouNCIL OFF.
REc. 9th year, 659th meeting 10 (S/PV.659) (1954).
98. U.N. Doc. No. S/2298/Rev. 1 (1951). See debates in U.N. Doc. No.
S/PV.658, S/PV.659, S/PV.661 to S/PV.664, as well as the debates concerning
The Bat Galim incident, S/PV.682 to S/PV.688, all in the 1954 Official record
of the U.N. Security Council.
99. U.N. Doc. No. S/1376 (1949).
100. U.N. SEcURTYv CouNcm OFF. REC. 5th year, Supp. Jan.-Dec. 1, at 122
(S/1907) (1950).
101. See authorities cited note 98 supra.
102. 1 NIEDLICOTT, THE EcoNomIc BLOCKADE 416-17 (1952), uses the term
"source" control of contraband as an alternative to control on the seas by
visit and search of neutral vessels. The term is used here to include any system
which controls contraband through measures at the loading points of a ship's
voyage.
the very existence of such procedures and regulations has served
as a deterrent to neutrals who would otherwise use the canal to
trade with Israel, and not to the lack of enforcement of contra-
band control.0 3 Egypt's reply has been that commerce through the
canal has been on the increase since the initiation of belligerent
controls and that there has been no restricting influence on total
neutral commerce through the canal regardless of the exercise or
nonexercise of these belligerent rights.
04
If both Israel and Egypt are right in their statements, then it
would appear that a small-power belligerent has applied a rather
effective regimen of control over neutral commerce with another
small-power belligerent without provoking significant economic
or military retaliation on the part of the impeded neutrals.10
III. GLOBAL WAR PRIZE LAW
APPLIED OUT OF CONTEXT
A. Tm NEED FOR A REEXAIINATION
In contrast to the global wars, neither Egypt nor Israel has
justified any incursion on neutral shipping rights on the basis of
reprisals. While in the World Wars the primary controls on neu-
tral commerce were put into effect by comprehensive reprisal
measures,0 8 in this situation the sole belligerent right exercised is
that of contraband control done primarily by visit and search of
neutral vessels. Furthermore, this is probably to be the pattern
in future limited wars where effective long-distance blockade repri-
sals will be outside the means and against the best interests of
103. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 6th year, 551st meeting 11
(S/PV.551) (1951); U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 9th year, 658th meeting
12, 14 (S/PV.658) (1954); U.N. SECURITY CouNcIL OFF. REC. 9th year, 659th
meeting 15 (S/PV.659) (1954).
104. For Egyptian arguments that total tanker traffic in the canal was not
curtailed by the new controls, see E1-HEFNAOUi, LES PRoBLMIEMs CONTE -
PORAINS POSES PAR LE CANAL DE SUEZ 229, 284-35 (1951), reporting increasing
traffic and tonnage in those years and an increase in tanker traffic. Statistics
have been presented by Egypt, U.N. SEcURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 6th year,
549th meeting 20 (S/PV.549) (1951); U.N. SECURITY CoUNcm OFF. REC. 9th
year, 658th meeting 30 (S/PV.658) (1953); U.N. SECURITY CoUNcm OFF. REC.
9th year, 659th meeting 11 (S/PV.659) (1954).
105. The events of October 1956 were the result of Egypt's nationaliza-
tion of the canal and not her prize relations with Israel except insofar as the
heightened tensions between the two at the time served to encourage Western
notions of Nasser's bad intentions.
106. See generally 2 OPPENHEIm, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 247-50 (7th ed.
Lauterpacht 1952).
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the belligerents and where a close blockade 0 7 will be impractical
or ineffective. Thus Egypt is applying global war contraband law
in the absence of those reprisal measures which had superseded
judicial prize law in importance in the global context. Taking
Egypt as our model, two questions are thus presented. First, of
what legal significance is the fact that global war contraband doc-
trine has now become the primary means of controlling neutral
commerce with an enemy in a limited war context? Second, apart
from its increased importance, to what extent can the application
of this contraband law be fundamentally challenged on the basis
that it is being applied out of context - that is, without the
presence of more far-reaching reprisal control measures?
If the role of judicial control of contraband has assumed a posi-
tion of importance in this limited war situation which it did not
have in a global war context, it would seem essential to consider
whether this might have any bearing on the scope of the belliger-
ent's right to define contraband. Stone categorizes the positions on
this issue as, (1) the Groatian view which "posits the proximate
relation of the goods to warlike activity" and, (2) the view that
the belligerent is free within the boundaries set by effective neu-
tral protest.'08 Assuming the validity of the belligerent's conten-
tion that the term "warlike activity" must be vastly expanded to
meet modern warfare conditions, it is still open to a limited war
neutral to maintain that a belligerent's freedom to designate con-
traband must be confined at the outer limits by effective neutral
protest. Thus, when an inherited contraband list includes items
which bear only the most indirect relationship to the activities of
war and that listing was made in the absence of effective0 9 neutral
protest, it is possible for the modern war neutral to maintain that
the discretion exercised in that vacuum cannot now be cited as the
limits of a belligerent's freedom in defining contraband.
Furthermore, a modern limited war neutral might conceivably
107. As defined by Smith, the traditional or close blockade was generally
"regarded as the maritime counterpart of seige by land, with which in practice
it was frequently combined. For this reason the original purpose of blockade
was purely strategic, the reduction of a defended place by cutting off all sup-
plies." SMli, THE LAw AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 110 (2d ed. 1950).
108. STONE, LEGrL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 479 (2d impres-
sion rev. 1959).
109. As used here, "effective" means that kind of protest which if trans-
lated into actual physical resistance would have a reasonable chance of
success. Perhaps only the United States could have "effectively" protested the
Allied contraband lists prior to its entry into both wars. But this is specula-
tion and we are concerned with the situation as it existed most of the time.
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cite the Declaration of London with its sizable "free" list for the
proposition that in the nineteenth century limited wars
certain definite limits existed on a belligerent's powers to define
contraband. Therefore, despite the disappearance of those limits
in a global war situation, and notwithstanding subsequent mod-
ernization, limited war belligerents must adjust to a limited war
standard in defining contraband. This standard should include at
least some room for "free" goods. It would seem, then, that the
scope of this right to define contraband might once more be made
the issue of legal controversy.
Implicit in the idea of granting a more central role to sub-
stantive contraband law in limited war than in global war is the
possibility of neutral objection to the application of particular
substantive global war contraband doctrines in the limited war
situation. The neutral in a limited war, when confronted by con-
traband law evolved during the World Wars, might well argue
that this law developed in the shadow of reprisal measures. There-
fore there was little direct acquiescence to contraband law as such
by the neutrals. That is, the supervening long-distance blockade
controls of all goods between overseas and adjacent neutrals
meant that the pinch of specific developments in contraband law
was not felt. Naturally, such neutral objections as existed were
focused on objecting to these more stringent measures and conse-
quently contraband doctrine developed by default. This would be
a frontal attack on the whole notion that the contraband law of
the World Wars represents the present state of the law as arrived
at by the lawmaking process of assertion followed by acquiescence
in that assertion.
Alternatively, the limited war neutral might submit that any
acquiescence by neutrals to specific contraband measures in a
total war context was acquiescence valid only under those par-
ticular circumstances. The neutrals concurred in an expansive con-
traband list and in an elimination of conditional contraband only
as this was done by global war belligerents, reserving their rights
in unforeseeable future conflicts. In addition, the modern neutral
might maintain that this accession was a matter of survival and
resulted from an inability to resist the demands of the global war
belligerent. In conclusion, the limited war neutral would urge
that today he should not be bound by law borne out of the weak-
ness of neutrals of the past.
The belligerent rejoinder to these arguments would be two-
fold. First, today's objecting neutrals who were belligerents in a
past global war are estopped from objecting to substantive doc-
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trines which they developed. This is the fact situation in the
Egyptian case, but as yet Egypt has not been forced to make this
rebuttal. Second, the above objections to the application of global
prize law to the limited war situation are not necessarily objec-
tions to the substantive content of the law itself. On the merits,
the belligerent would argue, this present day contraband law re-
flects a reasonable adjustment of the traditional law to modern
war circumstances.
This progression of arguments leads to the conclusion that the
limited war prize court does have a responsibility to reexamine
the merits of the global war law it is applying. The neutrals' con-
tentions only throw doubt on the applicability of this law in a
modern limited war. The burden should rest on the belligerent to
justify its use in his particular and different situation. In seeking
to assume the wide scope rights of the global war belligerent, the
limited war participant should also assume the burden of explain-
ing why this claim to total war rights is valid.
B. PROBLEMS OF REEXAINATION
1. The Need for Standards
The World Wars differed in more than size from prior wars -
in contrast to past history the goal of the belligerents was total
and unconditional defeat of the enemy state. Intense economic
warfare aimed at a total disruption of the enemy economy was
one factor in the expansion of the right of contraband control.
While the prize courts modified the old doctrines with reference
to the presence of totalitarian state controls, ease of transship-
ment from an adjacent neutral, and the increased susceptibility
of all goods to warlike use, these modifications were also based
on the underlying premise that prize law should serve the purpose
of total economic warfare.
In contrast to the objectives of the World War belligerents,
Egypt has maintained that she has exercised belligerent rights
solely for self-defense." 0 In effect, Egypt has been engaged in a
war limited both geographically and in objective. In this sense,
modern limited war is similar to those limited wars of the nine-
teenth century where:
war was fought for a limited and intelligible purpose and was
brought to an end by a reasonable peace settlement of limited effect.
All the states which were directly engaged were most anxious to secure
the sympathy of neutrals, and the danger of provoking neutral inter-
110. Conclusions du Gouvemement Egyptien, supra note 47, at 235.
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vention on the enemy side provided a very real sanction for the ob-
servance of the laws of war at sea.l i i
Furthermore, it should be assumed it is in the interest of the neu-
tral community to keep such conflicts confined 12 This being the
case, we may take the Egyptian example as typical of modern
limited wars in the sense that the belligerents seek limited mili-
tary goals.
If prize law in the limited war is to serve these more limited
belligerent objectives, in applying the global war precedents the
prize court should disregard doctrines incorporated into the law
primarily to serve total economic warfare objectives and use only
those changes made better to fulfill a continued purpose in the
light of new conditions. Total war doctrines usable in a limited
war situation should be applied only if the conditions referred to
in the global context are present in the specific limited war situ-
ation. This may be illustrated by more specific discussion.
2. Continuous Voyage
Global war belligerents expanded the scope of the right to visit
and search intraneutral shipping by expanding the grounds on
which the prize court could make findings of hostile destination.
These new presumptions were made necessary by the problems of
proof caused by easy indirect shipment to enemy destinations.
They were also justified as the only effective way of totally isolat-
ing the enemy economy. These presumptions of ultimate hostile
destination were evolved to facilitate the exercise of the traditional
right of visit and search, while the procedures for administering
them were intended to replace the right.
In exercising her rights of visit and search, Egypt has relied
on presumptions and doctrines based on factual probability which
were created to implement the global war principle of ultimate
destination. Egyptian prize law has also incorporated the burden
of proof rules applied by the global war belligerents; like
the World War powers, her Prize Court does not feel constrained
to look only to the ship itself for evidence. However, Egypt has
chosen not to ration or apply statistical presumptions of enemy
destination to cargoes going through the canal to Genoa or Cyprus.
The contraband control practices which Egypt has adopted
111. SiTir, op. cit. supra note 107, at 75.
112. Reference to the arms embargo which was initially imposed by the
great powers on the Middle East in 1948-49 is made in N.Y. Times, June 18,
1949, p. 5, col. 4.
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do not relate to or serve economic blockade purposes. Rather
they are a means designed to meet the evidentiary problems in-
volved. Thus, the court has not been faced with the duty of
ferreting out and segregating any implicit global purpose doctrines.
Furthermore, the conditions which justified these new presump-
tions and rules of evidence during global wars seem to be equally
present in a limited war situation.
The tanker restrictions imposed also are an implementation of
the doctrine of ultimate destination or continuous voyage. As a
compulsory "source" control, they appear similar to the compul-
sory navicert scheme. Note, however, that the effect of this scheme
is only to inhibit direct traffic in a contraband item with the
enemy. Passage is denied only if the carrier refuses to agree to
guarantee his innocent destination and not because a navicert is
withheld for some undisclosed reason. Neither is any quota or ra-
tioning used in permitting the tanker passage. If the principle of
"source" controls was recognized during the World Wars, then
this one use limited to a single contraband item would seem to be
justified.
Nevertheless, such techniques may no longer be feasible or
desirable in a limited war context. In most cases, an effective sys-
tem will be beyond the means of a limited war belligerent. Also,
submission to such a system may provoke seizures for nonneutral
service by the offended belligerent. It would seem Israel might
have done so in this case. If the neutral powers' main interest is
in limiting such conflicts, it would seem doubtful they would toler-
ate such a system except in unusual circumstances such as Egypt's
control of the Suez Canal.
3. Definition of Contraband
Assuming that a modem limited war has more limited objec-
tives than did the World Wars, the term "warlike use" defined so
widely by the global war belligerents should be restricted to a
more limited military sense. The argument by a neutral in the
Egyptian situation might well be that since Egypt claims to be
engaged in a defensive war the court has no business confiscating
relief clothing, foodstuffs, or other products which can only have
an indirect effect on Israel's ability to wage war. This has not
been a prolonged war of attrition, and domestic economic strength
should not prove determinative. Egypt, however, seems justified
in asserting that the technological changes in waging warfare
present in global war also exist in mechanized limited wars. How-
[Vol. 50:849
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ever, while this may be true it should not justify seizing goods as
contraband merely because their introduction into the enemy
economy will permit release of some other item for military usage.
The introduction of this principle 13 into limited war contraband
usage brands everything as contraband and in so doing incor-
porates global war economic strangulation purposes into a limited
war.
In summary, it seems in a war of limited or defined military
objectives the definition of contraband should be limited to items
of direct military usage. The exact definition depends on prize
court findings as to the state of technology of the enemy.
The present distinction between conditional and absolute con-
traband may also require reexamination before it can be used in a
limited war situation. Although many items of conditional contra-
band were reclassified as absolute contraband for a number of
reasons, the change was effected primarily under the theory that
the total controls exercised by a totalitarian belligerent meant that
all goods destined for the country were, in fact, destined for the
belligerent government. Thus, if a belligerent involved in a future
limited war has a totalitarian government, the doctrine would
seem to be useable in its present form. However, a prize court
faced with shipments to a nontotalitarian enemy will have to
reappraise the relevancy of the distinction.
It should be noted that the Egyptian Prize Court saw no duty
to make specific findings as to particular war measures employed
by the Israelis. Nor did it consider the extent to which the Israeli
Government was exercising total control of the national economy
such that ostensibly civilian destinations were in fact to be used
militarily. Moreover, even if the seizing of conditional contraband
is viewed as a reasonable adaptation to new circumstances (rather
than as an incorporation of more far-reaching total war doctrines),
it is still essential that a prize court determine whether the enemy's
war measures and the degree of government control present justify
blurring the distinction between absolute and conditional contra-
band. Similarly, if a prize court chooses to seize conditional contra-
band because the entire enemy population is engaged in the war
effort, specific findings of fact are again required.
C. THE EFFECT OF NEUTRAL - BETT GBRENT CONFLICT
Assuming a situation where a limited war belligerent diverts
neutral shipping to its own ports for purposes of contraband con-
118. See CoLoMBos, PRIz 182-97 (Sd ed. 1949).
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trol, and assuming also a substantial volume of neutral protest,
it appears that three main paths of reaction to neutral protest
are open to the belligerent.
First, it can do nothing about the neutral protests and continue
the practice of diversion. However, Egyptian reaction indicates
even a belligerent possessed of substantial countervailing power
vis-h-vis powerful neutrals will act when the volume of neutral
protests becomes loud enough. The first choice marks the most
dangerous course for the belligerent -one where the risks may
well outweigh the advantages of a strict policy against the enemy
belligerent.
Second, it can relax the enforcement of the expansive global
war doctrine which it refuses to discard or modify. This is basically
what Egypt has done in applying the law of contraband. Rather
than attempt to tailor down a global war doctrine to fit a limited
war situation by narrowing the contraband definition or restoring
the conditional-unconditional distinction, Egypt has merely
allowed contraband to pass through when conditions warranted.
If this is the pattern for the future application of global war
doctrine to limited war settings, certain problems are presented.
This irregular exercise of belligerent rights is done at the dis-
cretion of the belligerent without notice to the neutrals. In the
long run, such a pattern would tend to aggravate belligerent-neu-
tral tensions. Furthermore, it is incompatible with any system of
public international law which seeks to achieve predictability as
to the legal consequences of state actions. Nevertheless, this may
be the only alternative where the body of law itself has not
developed substantive distinctions between large scale and small
scale conflicts.
Finally, the belligerent can exercise, on a regular basis, sub-
stantive rights of a more limited scope. This procedure of adapta-
tion, however, would require a constant assertion by both parties
of their conflicting versions of the scope of their respective rights.
A global war doctrine will be hammered into a new limited war
shape only through constant, conflicting pressures. If the limited
war belligerent chooses to stop enforcing his rights altogether
when the pressure from neutrals becomes too heavy, rather than
to modify the scope of those rights, it seems doubtful that any
distinct limited war prize law can develop.
Thus to mold a new doctrine the neutrals must have more than
an interest in merely confining the conflict. They must have an
interest in expanding the scope of their right to trade with belliger-
ents. While it may be expected that neutrals will seek confinement,
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it is not altogether clear they will always be compelled to pursue
expanded trade rights. Today, when the great commercial powers
have interests throughout the world, a limited restriction is not
likely to prove disastrous. Furthermore, while the balance of
power may weigh in favor of the neutrals in a limited war, it must
also be remembered that it will take considerable belligerent
pressure to bring about concerted neutral reaction. When Great
Britain was faced with a loss of three-fourths of the oil supply to
its Haifa refinery it protested through normal diplomatic chan-
nels. When it was threatened with a cut off of all oil shipments
through the canal it invaded Egypt.
It is in this very important way that modem limited war
differs from the localized conflicts of the nineteenth century when
neutral commercial rights dominated prize law. In the nine-
teenth century undiversified economic structures could be unbal-
anced by the severance of one of a few major trade routes. Thus,
neutral trading rights were to be jealously protected. Increased
trade in the twentieth century has mitigated the effect of the
economic loss caused by the foreclosure of a single trade route or
market.
CONCLUSION
Despite the renewed importance of the prize doctrine of con-
traband seizure in a limited war context, it appears there has
been little in the way of development of a separate standard in
that law for limited war belligerents. This is due in part to the
fact that the expansive grounds for seizure of neutral commerce
have only been infrequently applied. In part, it would also seem to
be due to the fact that some of the reasons which led to the ex-
pansion of these doctrines by global war belligerents are also
present in a limited war context. Thus, Egypt can claim that
mechanized warfare, whether large or small scale, must necessarily
lead to a broader definition of contraband.
Assuming contraband law will continue to be of central impor-
tance in future limited wars, the responsibility lies with the prize
courts to reexamine World War contraband doctrine. Such a
judicial reconsideration, however, must await the diligent asser-
tion of a more expanded version of neutral rights by the neutrals
themselves. Diplomatic protest rather than prize court argument
has been the means of neutral objection in the Egyptian situation,
thus making development of new prize doctrines difficult. Al-
though global war doctrines have been found to be oversized,
there has been little attempt made to modify them down to scale.
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